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Abstract 
I argue that there is a wide variety of epistemic norms, distributed along two different 
spectra. One spectrum runs from the ideal to the practical and concerns the extent to 
which it is possible to follow the norm given our cognitive and epistemic limitations. The 
other spectrum runs from thin to thick and concerns the extent to which the norm 
concerns facts about our beliefs over and above the content of the belief. Many putative 
epistemic norms, such as truth and various conceptions of justification, can be found at 
different points on the spectra. There is no single obvious privileged point from which to 
say any of these norms is more fundamental than the others, though there may be some 
reason to doubt that some of the norms are intrinsically interesting.  
 
Epistemology is the study of our beliefs and whether they are good beliefs. This may 
be a bit tendentious; there are those who would argue that beliefs are not part of our 
mental furniture, and even relentless naturalists such as Quine who argue that belief is not 
normative at all.1 But supposing we do take our mind to represent the world through 
beliefs, and supposing we do take there to be norms on those beliefs, we may ask 
 
1 Stich (1983) is one person who has argued that our mind is not best described in 
terms of belief. Toward the end of this essay I will consider the views of Wiliamson 
(2000) that we should consider knowledge as a mental state that is more 
fundamental than any state of belief. The locus classicus for the naturalized non-
normative view of epistemology is Quine (1969). 
ourselves about those norms: What makes a belief a good belief? What should we 
believe?  
 It might seem that these are effectively the same question. We should believe 
whatever it takes to make our beliefs good; so if we can figure out what makes a belief 
good, that is the end of the story about epistemic norms. The epistemic norm is whatever 
property makes a belief good. I will argue that this is mistaken. Even if we have one 
conception of the epistemic good, there will still be many norms that flow from that 
conception.  
An answer to the question “What makes a belief a good belief?” gives us an epistemic 
ideal. Whatever our answer is, it tells us what our beliefs would be like if we were in the 
best possible epistemic situation. An answer to the question “What should we believe?” 
or “How should we form beliefs?” may be more practical. Answering this question might 
tell us what actions or processes we actually should be using to form beliefs, given our 
actual epistemic situation and cognitive capabilities; or it might tell us what beliefs would 
result from these actions or processes. Each of these answers can be seen as yielding an 
epistemic norm, one more idealized, one more practical. But there will also be  
intermediate norms. We need not make a simple binary choice between an ideal or a 
practical point of view; rather there is a spectrum of points of view between these 
extremes, and from different viewpoints different norms seem appropriate. 
The ideal-practical spectrum is not the only way in which epistemic viewpoints can 
vary. We can also consider what I will call thinner and thicker viewpoints. A thin 
viewpoint is one from which we consider individual propositions in isolation as 
something to be believed or not. Confronted with a proposition, we ask “Should I believe 
this?” or “Would belief in this proposition be a good belief?” A thicker viewpoint takes 
into account more than an isolated proposition. It allows for questions such as “How 
should I believe this proposition?”, “Would belief in this proposition make sense in light 
of my beliefs in other propositions?”, or “How might belief in this proposition fit in with 
my entire system of beliefs?” Thickness and thinness also admits of degrees: We might 
consider a proposition in isolation, or against the background of a narrowly 
circumscribed set of related propositions, or against our entire belief system; and we 
might consider more or less about the way that we believe a proposition, over and above 
the fact that we do believe the proposition. 
So there are at least two spectra along which we may locate a viewpoint from which 
we ask epistemic questions.2 We may take up a viewpoint that is more practical or more 
ideal, that is thicker and thinner. Any viewpoint along these two spectra may be 
associated with a different epistemic norm. So there will be not just a plurality of 
epistemic norms but potentially an entire coordinate system of them, each appropriate to 
a different epistemological project.  
 
1. Advice And Practicality 
The best way to understand the practicality-ideality axis is by analogy to advice about 
actions. A norm can be thought of in terms of an associated property P, such that only 
beliefs with property P satisfy the norm. Endorsing a norm associated with P is like 
 
2 There may also be a spectrum from what we might call static to dynamic norms, 
where static norms take our current epistemic situation for granted and dynamic 
norms consider how our epistemic situation may change or what we might do to 
change it. And perhaps there are other ways in which our epistemic viewpoints 
might vary. 
advising “Hold all and only beliefs with property P.” But, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Weiner 2005), advice about actions falls along a spectrum from the ideal to the practical, 
so epistemic norms plausibly fall along a similar spectrum. Advice about actions can be 
rooted in the practicalities of the advisee’s capabilities or by idealized to what she would 
be able to accomplish in the best of all possible worlds, and neither kind of advice is 
necessarily superior to the other. Epistemic norms can similarly be rooted in practicalities 
or aimed at an ideal. 
Consider an advisee with a fixed overarching goal but limits on her ability to achieve 
it. Suppose that Alice has the overarching goal of scoring well in bowling; any advice we 
give her is directed to that end and only that end. In one way, “Knock down all the pins” 
would be excellent advice. If she manages to follow this advice, she will certainly score 
well. Nevertheless, the advice does not seem very helpful, for we have not told Alice how 
to knock all the pins down, and in fact it may not always be within her power to do so. 
More helpful advice may be “Hit the head pin on the right.” If Alice always can hit the 
head pin on the right she may not score as high as if she always knocks down all the pins, 
since sometimes she will succeed in hitting the pins in this way without knocking them 
all down. But the advice is more helpful because it will be easier for Alice to do what we 
have advised her to do.  
Still, even this may not always be within her power to do; she may bowl for that spot 
and fail. If we want to give Alice advice that she can follow without fail, perhaps we 
should say “Try to hit the head pin on the right.” Alice may not be able to hit the head pin 
on the right at will, but she can always try to. Yet succeeding in following this advice is 
still less likely to result in a high bowling score than succeeding in following the advice 
to hit the head pin on the right, for when Alice does try and fail to hit the head pin on the 
right she will likely knock down fewer pins.  
Here we have a spectrum of different advice, all in the service of the same goal of a 
high bowling score. The advice varies in how much successfully following the advice 
conduces to Alice’s goal, and in how much control Alice has over whether she does 
successfully follow the advice. Conduciveness and control yield one spectrum, not two, 
because good advice must balance any loss of control by a gain in conduciveness. 
Consider the advice “Roll the ball in the gutter”; this may be something that Alice can 
accomplish every time, but accomplishing it will not conduce to a high bowling score 
even to the extent that accomplishing “Try to hit the head pin to the right” will. If we give 
Alice advice that she can successfully follow with a certain rate of success, we should 
give her the advice that best conduces to a high score among all advice that she can 
successfully follow with that rate. So less control requires more conduciveness and vice 
versa.  
Note further that no particular place on the control-conduciveness spectrum need be 
privileged. “Knock down all the pins” seems like obviously unhelpful advice to an 
ordinary bowler, but it might be just the thing to say to a perfect athlete who does not 
know the rules of bowling. The advice that is most conducive to the goal expresses the 
ideal goal of the advisee’s action. It idealizes away her limitations. Advice that can be 
followed readily but may not achieve the goal when successfully followed is practical 
with respect to the advisee’s capabilities. But neither the idealized end nor the practical 
end of the spectrum is necessarily superior to each other, or to any place in between.  
Epistemic norms are subject to similar considerations of practicality and ideality. Let 
us begin by considering thin norms, which apply to individual propositions in isolation 
and consider only whether believing that proposition would be epistemically good for a 
subject (without considering anything else about the belief). Suppose that there is some 
property G such that believing in propositions with G is an unconditional epistemic good. 
Clearly it is some sort of epistemic norm that we should believe propositions with G. If 
every proposition you believe is G and you believe every G proposition, then you have 
attained this epistemic good to its fullest extent, and (since it is a good) in some sense you 
should do this. Yet it might be the case that most non-ideal subjects could not unfailingly 
ensure that they believed all and only the G propositions. Either their cognitive 
limitations prevent them from evaluating whether propositions are G; or, leaving their 
limitations aside, they do not have evidence that puts them in a position to distinguish 
every G proposition from a non-G proposition. In that case, the norm “Believe the G 
propositions” is like the advice to knock down all the pins. It is ideal rather than practical; 
it expresses what would be best if we could attain it, while abstracting away from the 
limitations that may prevent us from unfailingly attaining it.  
 
2. Truth And Justification 
I mentioned two kinds of limitation, evidential and cognitive. Let us begin by 
focusing on the evidential limitations. Any given believer will have certain information 
by which she can judge how the world is. Remaining as noncommittal as possible about 
exactly what the nature of that information is, let us call the state of having that 
information her evidential state. For instance, if one’s evidence consisted entirely in 
having had certain sense-experiences, one’s evidential state would be the state of having 
had those sense-experiences.  
In general, a norm of belief can be expressed in terms of a relation between believers 
and beliefs; if relation R holds between subject S and belief b, then S ought to hold belief 
b according to the norm that corresponds to R. We can classify these relations in terms of 
the facts that determine whether R holds of b for a given S. If whether S bears R1 to b is 
determined entirely by S’s evidential state, and whether S bears R2 to b depends in part on 
facts that go beyond S’s evidential state, then P2 is more idealized than P1; it abstracts 
away from some of the limits of S’s evidence.3 Intuitively, the more facts that R may 
depend on other than those determined by S’s evidential state, the more idealized the 
norm corresponding to R is. There may be no rigorous way to define “more facts” in this 
sense, but it should be intuitively clear at least in some cases; in particular, the most 
idealized relations R will be those that can depend on any fact that there is.  
(Now a bit of terminological simplification. For any relation R between subjects and 
beliefs, holding the subject S fixed yields a property of beliefs: being a belief b such that 
S bears R to b. Since it is generally obvious who the subject of beliefs is, I will often 
speak of norms as corresponding to a property of beliefs rather than to a relation between 
subjects and beliefs. I will also tend to identify the norm “Hold all and only beliefs that 
have property P” with the property P itself, so that I can speak of a property occupying a 
place on the spectrum of epistemic norms. And, as mentioned above, for the thinnest 
 
3 More explicitly, suppose that for any two subjects S1 and S2 who have the same 
evidential state, S1 bears R1 to a given b if and only if S2 bears R1 to b. And suppose 
that R2 lacks this property; there is some b such that S1 bears R2 to b and S2 does not, 
even though S1 and S2 have the same evidential state. Then the norm corresponding 
to R2 is more idealized than the norm corresponding to R1. 
norms the only fact about a belief that matters is the believed proposition, so these norms 
may be seen as a property of propositions rather than beliefs, if we are holding the subject 
fixed.) 
The considerations about which facts a property of beliefs depends on tell us where it 
falls along the practical-ideal axis. In the analogy to advice, this corresponds to our 
chance of successfully following a certain piece of advice. As good advice must be the 
most conducive to the goal given how easy it is to follow, an epistemic norm must be the 
property that best conduces to the epistemic good, given its place on the practicality-
ideality axis; which is to say, given the facts that it depends on. Once we have decided 
the limitations on the facts we may take into account when deciding whether our subject 
ought to believe something, the norm that we place on beliefs ought to be whatever 
property produces the most epistemic good within those limitations.4  
Consider thin norms again, represented as properties of the propositions that are to be 
believed. What thin epistemic norms will we find at various points along the practical-
ideal axis? The norm at the ideal extreme corresponds to a property that may depend on 
any facts whatsoever. This should be the property of being a proposition that we would 
want to believe irrespective of the limits on our epistemic position; what we should 
believe with all the facts at our disposal and unlimited mental power to process them. 
Clearly these are all and only the true propositions. If we could help ourselves to all the 
 
4 In (Weiner 2005) I argue at greater length for a similar conception of epistemic 
norms. 
facts, then we could help ourselves to the facts about whether any given proposition is 
true, and that is enough to determine that we should believe it.5  
Hence truth is the epistemic norm that we find at the thinnest and most idealized point 
on the epistemic spectra. This idealized viewpoint lets us avoid the standard objection to 
truth as a norm of belief, that true beliefs may result from lucky guesses or otherwise be 
unjustified by our evidence. Since we are considering the most idealized epistemic norm, 
the limits imposed by our evidence are completely irrelevant, and the objection gains no 
traction. 
Not too far away from the extreme ideal end, we find familiar internalist and 
externalist notions of justification. Take a reliabilist notion of justification on which a 
belief is justified if and only if it is attained through an actually reliable process.6 
Assuming that this property is well-defined, it depends on the facts concerning how 
certain beliefs were arrived at and the facts that determine the reliability of those 
processes. This makes it a somewhat thick norm, as it depends not only on the 
proposition that is believed but on the process that the believer used to arrive at that 
belief. A completely thin concept of externalist justification would have to abstract from 
the actual way that beliefs are arrived at, perhaps as follows: S is thinly externally 
justified in believing p if and only if there is some reliable method M by which S could 
come to believe p. Supposing that this property is well-defined, it is less idealized than 
 
5 It might be thought that we could say the same thing about knowledge: If we could 
help ourselves to all the facts, then we would want to believe all the propositions 
that we knew to be true. But this analysis does not motivate any special role for the 
propositions that we actually do know. It does motivate a special role for the 
propositions that we would know if we had all the facts, but those are all and only 
the actually true propositions. (Thanks to John Turri for pressing me on this point.) 
6 See, e.g., Goldman (1979).  
truth as a norm, because it does not take into account every fact that there is; only facts 
concerning the availability of belief-forming methods, the reliability of those methods, 
and what beliefs those methods would yield.7 
Compare now an internalist notion of justification: Belief in proposition p is 
internalistically justified if p is likely to be true given the believer’s evidential position. 
(Here we must set some threshold for how likely it must be, as the reliabilist must set 
some threshold for how reliable the methods involved must be.) Reliabilist justification 
depended only on a limited set of facts beyond the subject’s evidential situation; 
internalist justification so defined depends on no facts beyond the subject’s evidential 
situation. So internalist justification is more practical than reliabilist justification, which 
is in turn more practical than truth. Each should be the most truth-conducive property 
given the facts that it is allowed to depend on. Truth is of course the most truth-conducive 
property of all; if one is allowed to consider only facts about the reliability of available 
methods and their output, the most truth-conducive way to form one’s beliefs is to 
believe the outputs of the reliable methods; and if one is only allowed to consider one’s 
evidential state, the most truth-conducive beliefs will be those that that state makes likely. 
 
7 The original thicker notion of externalist justification might fail to be well-defined 
because of the generality problem: whether the process through which a belief was 
attained is reliable can depend on how that process is described (Feldman 1985). 
The thinner notion may share this problem, and may also encounter the problem of 
defining which methods are available. I will not worry about whether these 
problems are solvable, as my concern is not with the workability of any particular 
flavor of reliabilism but with the place of externalist notions of justification on the 
practical-ideal spectrum. Even if externalist justification as described in the text is 
not well-defined, there should be well-defined externalist notions of justification 
that occupy similar places on the epistemic spectra. 
So all these properties are norms that occupy different points on the practical-evidential 
axis.8  
 
3. Working Within Our Limitations 
Even though internalist justification does not idealize the believer’s epistemic 
situation, it ignores any limits there may be on her processing power. Ordinary human 
beings will not in general be capable of ensuring that we believe all and only what is 
justified by the totality of our evidence; we lack the computational power to reevaluate all 
our beliefs anew as new evidence comes in. So internalist justification is not the most 
practical thin epistemic norm. The injunction “Believe only what is internalistically 
justified” would be one that we could not always follow, even though the norm it 
embodies depends only on our evidential situation. More practical epistemic norms will 
be those that take some account of our cognitive limitations; the more they take them into 
account, the more practical they will be.  
Some way down the practical end of the spectrum, we might be interested in a belief 
revision theory of the sort put forth by Harman (1986). Harman points out (p. 27) that we 
do not have the mental resources to constantly update our degrees of belief in response to 
new evidence. Though his immediate target is Bayesian epistemology, the point applies 
to any theory of internalist justification, in which whether a belief is justified can depend 
on any aspect of our evidential situation. If we are to conform to the epistemic norm that 
 
8 I present a similar argument in more detail in (Weiner 2005), in particular arguing 
that internalist justification is a viable epistemic norm even though it is less truth-
conducive than externalist justification.  
we believe whatever is justified by our evidential situation, we might have to update all 
our beliefs whenever our evidential situation changed.  
In contrast, Harman’s belief revision principles are based on the idea that we cannot 
clutter our minds with infinitely many beliefs and that we cannot constantly reevaluate 
our beliefs without some specific reason to think they are mistaken, among others. Hence 
his norms of belief differ greatly from those of internalist justification. To take one 
example, the Principle of Conservatism is that “One is justified in continuing to fully 
accept something in the absence of a special reason not to” (p. 46). If we idealize away 
our cognitive limitations, there is no need for the Principle of Conservatism, since we 
could always evaluate our beliefs anew with every new piece of evidence. From a less 
idealized perspective that takes into account some aspects of what we can actually do 
given our cognitive limitations, the Principle of Conservatism can be seen as part of an 
epistemic norm.9 The injunction “Continue to hold your beliefs unless there is a specific 
reason not to” would be easier to conform to in practice than “Believe whatever is 
justified by your total evidential situation,” even if both operate within our evidential 
limits; so the first injunction is a more practical epistemic norm. Note that this, like 
standard reliabilist justification, is a somewhat thick norm; it depends not only on the 
proposition believed but also on how that belief was arrived at. 
There are more practical norms, however. Harman’s theory takes into account some 
of our cognitive limitations, but (as Harman acknowledges, p. 9) it still idealizes our 
cognitive powers somewhat. For instance, to follow the Rule of Conservatism we must be 
able to recognize when we do have a reason to revisit our beliefs. Sometimes some of us 
 
9 The epistemic norm, stated in full, would be to follow the entire set of Harman’s 
belief revision principles.  
will not be able to recognize this. In contrast Bishop and Trout (2005) aim to offer 
epistemic principles that respect all our cognitive limits, making epistemology “a 
discipline that offers practical, real-world recommendations for living” (p. 6). Bishop and 
Trout argue that we should seek out and employ Statistical Prediction Rules, evaluating 
certain questions in terms of simple linear combinations of a limited number of 
measurable variables; for instance, to diagnose a patient as psychotic if a combination of 
five factors on a personality test adds up to 45 or more (see p. 14, citing Goldberg 1965). 
These prediction rules, they argue, are more likely to yield correct judgments than 
attempts by experts to evaluate the totality of available evidence. Hence a simple norm 
that we should believe in accordance with prediction rules would be, on their telling, the 
most truth-conducive of all injunctions that we could invariably carry out given our 
actual cognitive limitations as well as our evidential situation. Like Harman’s, this is a 
somewhat thick norm that depends partly on how beliefs are formed.  
Note that Trout and Bishop’s prescriptions depend specifically on a refusal to idealize 
our cognitive capacities. Besides their explicit citation of our cognitive limits (p. 39), they 
suggest that some prediction rules apply only to problems that people tend to get wrong 
(p. 33). They also, like Harman, concern themselves with how we may efficiently 
allocate our cognitive resources; Bayesian updating and deductive closure, they argue, 
may be more reliable than our normal reasoning practices but also more expensive in 
terms of cognitive resources (p. 68). This expense would not matter if our cognitive 
resources were not limited. Indeed, Bishop and Trout acknowledge that the costs 
involved in learning and carrying out their some of the strategies they discuss may be 
high enough that some people might reason better by sticking to their old reasoning 
patterns.10 As we would expect from a norm that is farther toward the practical end of the 
axis, they are trading off some truth-conduciveness to consider properties that people can 
actually evaluate.  
Even a norm that we can invariably respect to given our cognitive limitations and 
epistemic situation may not be the most practical of epistemic norms. That we can respect 
a norm does not mean that we will respect it. To return to the analogy with advice, if the 
most goal-conducive advice that is within the advisee’s power is not advice that the 
advisee would follow, it may be more practical to give advice that would be followed, 
even if following it is somewhat less conducive to the goal. Analogously, even if 
following strategic prediction rules is the most truth-conducive thing that people can 
actually do given their cognitive and evidential limits, people seem to have considerable 
resistance to adopting them and other belief-forming strategies that are suggested by 
results in social psychology;11 and Bishop and Trout worry about how ineffective their 
counsel will be if it is restricted to specialized journals (p. 102). If epistemic norms that it 
is easy to get people to conform to count as more practical than norms that merely respect 
our cognitive limitations, the most practical epistemic norm might be one that was likely 
to be disseminated and followed. Exactly what that norm might be I do not know; I am 
not aware of any philosophers who have a theory of the most effective epistemic advice 
that people will actually listen to.  
 
 
10 See in particular their discussion of frequency format probability analysis and 
consider-the-opposite strategies (Bishop and Trout 2005, pp. 68-9).  
11 For instance, Bishop and Trout mention (p. 150) that some philosophers insist on 
holding job interviews even though they are aware of experiments that suggest that 
they do not improve the quality of hiring decisions. 
4. Thick Norms 
The norms I have considered up till now have been more or less thin; if they have 
concerned any facts about a belief other than its content, it has been relatively narrow 
facts about how the belief was arrived at. We can also consider thicker epistemic norms, 
which may concern how a belief relates to other beliefs, the extent of these other beliefs 
depending on the thickness of the norm; or what sort of dispositions and virtues a belief 
reflects; or any other aspect of a belief that might contribute some sort of epistemic good. 
In the extreme case, where the most idealized thinnest norm expressed which individual 
propositions we would want to believe in the ideal epistemic situation, the most idealized 
thickest norm will express what overall total epistemic state we would want to have in the 
ideal epistemic state.  
For this thick norm, believing all and only true propositions will not be enough. Once 
we consider aspects of a belief beyond the proposition that is believed, truth alone will 
not be the sole epistemic good of belief. For instance, it is epistemically good to believe a 
proposition on proper grounds. Beyond that, we will want to understand why the 
proposition is true.12 Indeed, the most idealized and thickest norm will be the highest 
epistemic state of all: understanding everything.  
The thickest norms of all may depend on any aspect of a belief, and the most 
idealized norms may depend on any facts. So for a belief to satisfy the most idealized 
thickest norm, it must be a belief that is ideal in every way, irrespective of any of our 
epistemic or cognitive limitations. Mere true belief will not be enough here; we will want 
the belief to have come about in the right way and to have the right sort of relations to our 
 
12 Zagzebski (1996) and Kvanvig (2003) are two authors who have emphasized the 
importance of understanding as an epistemic norm.  
other beliefs. Part of this means knowing which other propositions make our belief true 
and explain it. But it is then in turn desirable to understand those propositions, and to 
understand the propositions that make them true and explain them, and so on until we 
have complete understanding of any truth there is. Since we are concerned with the 
thickest possible epistemic norm, there is no reason to stop short of complete 
understanding of everything. This may provide some motivation for a sort of unity of the 
epistemic good; we cannot completely understand one thing without completely 
understanding anything. Without any limits imposed by our epistemic situation or the 
generality with which we may consider our propositional attitudes, this is the epistemic 
ideal we will arrive at. (We may also need to have arrived at this understanding in the 
right way, but it seems as though complete understanding should be self-legitimating; if 
you understand everything, you can confirm all your beliefs in a well-grounded way.)13  
A less totalizing notion of understanding will be found away from the thick extreme 
of the thick-thin spectrum. When we consider a somewhat less thick norm, we will be 
evaluating a belief in a particular proposition in the context of the believer’s attitudes 
toward certain related propositions without expanding our view to every proposition there 
is. If we are at the ideal end of the spectrum, we need not worry about limits imposed by 
our evidential situation, so we may arrive at the injunction “Believe the truth about this 
 
13 John Turri suggests that having a true belief about everything will entail 
understanding everything, since some of the propositions one believes will be the 
truths about explanatory relations among one’s beliefs. This may be true, in which 
case having complete understanding of everything will be extensionally equivalent 
to believing all and only the truths. Yet, since moving a little way away from the 
thick extreme of the epistemic spectrum yields a norm to do with understanding in a 
specific area rather than true belief in a specific area, I think it is more useful to 
think of the thickest norm as a norm of complete understanding rather than one of 
complete true belief. 
proposition and about those propositions that explain its truth, and understand why the 
proposition is true in terms of related propositions.” We need not understand all the 
related propositions in turn, since we are not looking for the thickest possible norm, but 
the belief in question must be true, known, and understood in terms of its relations to 
further true propositions. The idealized slightly less thick norm is that of understanding 
with knowledge. This contrasts with Kvanvig’s argument for understanding as an 
epistemic norm; Kvanvig argues that understanding does not entail knowledge (2003, p. 
196ff.). But this kind of understanding might perhaps be found further away from the 
ideal end of the epistemic spectra. Whether we know a proposition can depend on facts 
outside our evidential situation, so a conception of understanding that does not entail 
knowledge will be less idealized than one that does. If we are at a point on the practical-
ideal axis that restricts us to properties that depend on our evidential situation, but we 
thicken our norm so that it takes into account our attitudes to related propositions, the 
resulting norm may be that we come to the best understanding we can of the proposition 
given the limits on our epistemic situation.  
Another way in which a norm can be thicker rather than thinner is to involve the way 
that a belief is arrived at, as well as the proposition that is believed. I have already 
mentioned that reliabilist justification, Harman’s belief-revision, and Bishop and Trout’s 
statistical prediction rules all yield norms that require beliefs to have been formed in the 
right way. The concept of internalist justification I have discussed might similarly be 
thickened; a belief that p would satisfy this norm if the subject’s evidential situation 
makes it likely and if the subject believes it because her evidential situation makes it 
likely. This would add a grounding relation to justification, but might not be as thick as 
full understanding, which extends not only to the way the belief is formed but also to the 
subject’s attitudes to related propositions. (Or perhaps neither norm should be said to be 
thicker than the other; there may be no complete linear ordering of thickness.)   
As with thin norms, more practical thick norms involve not only our evidential 
situation but our cognitive limits. Here we find norms that tell us what general habits of 
mind conduce to the epistemic good, given our limitations. For example, Montmarquet 
discusses virtues of impartiality, intellectual sobriety, and intellectual courage.14 These 
virtues are thick in that they concern how beliefs are formed and concern a variety of 
propositions; it seems impossible to exercise these virtues with respect to one proposition 
only. They are toward the practical end of the spectra because they presuppose cognitive 
limitations. Someone with infinite cognitive power would have no need for impartiality, 
for she would be able to evaluate the evidence for beliefs without regard to whether they 
were her own or another’s. She would never need to consult another’s evaluation of 
evidence they shared. Impartiality and intellectual sobriety are needed so that we can 
recognize our intellectual limitations and come to the best beliefs we can in spite of them. 
Even further to the practical end of the spectrum we may find general habits of inquiry 
rooted in the psychological literature discussed by Bishop and Trout, such as finding 
generally applicable statistical prediction rules, considering reasons that go against your 
view (Bishop and Trout 2005, p. 144ff), and considering Bayesian problems in terms of 




14 For an extended treatment of these and other intellectual virtues, see Zagzebski 
(1996). 
5. Pluralism And Its Limits 
So far my discussion has been sunnily pluralistic. I have aimed to show that there are 
many different epistemic norms, each valid from a different standpoint, and that no one 
of these standpoints need be better than another. Whether we ask what our ideal belief 
would be or whether we ask what is within our capacities to believe, whether we focus 
exclusively on the content of our beliefs or whether we consider other aspects, whether 
we consider beliefs one at a time or whether we evaluate a belief against the background 
of related beliefs; all these perspectives can be valid, and all yield different epistemic 
norms. But this does not mean that just any concept that might seem to be an epistemic 
norm is one.  
The first way we might want to limit pluralism concerns the question of whether all 
points on the epistemic spectra are equal. We have been finding possible norms by 
choosing a point on the spectra and considering the most epistemically effective property 
that meets the constraints on epistemic properties set by that point. (For instance, that thin 
norms depend only on the proposition that is believed, and that at a certain point on the 
practical-ideal axis the property in question can depend only on the subject’s evidential 
situation.) As I argued by analogy to advice, no one point on the spectra is the single right 
point for finding epistemic norms. There are reasons to consider the norms we get by 
idealizing our epistemic situation, and there are reasons to consider the norms we get by 
considering our evidence and powers exactly as they are. But this need not mean that 
every single point on the spectra yields an epistemic norm of equal interest or 
importance.  
Some points on the spectra clearly are of interest, so that the norms they yield will be 
important epistemic norms. The most extreme idealized norms tell us what our ideal 
epistemic state would be. The most extreme practical norms prescribe give us ways to 
actually improve our epistemic state. But elsewhere on the spectra, we may wonder why 
we should be interested in the most epistemically effective property that satisfies these 
particular constraints. Perhaps the degree of idealization or thickness at that point on the 
spectra isn’t particularly natural, and there is no reason to care about a property that is 
exactly that idealized, no more or no less. 
My suspicions here are directed at the reliabilist notion of justification. As discussed 
above, this notion of justification is far toward the idealized end of the spectra; not only 
does it abstract away from our cognitive limits, it even abstracts away from some of the 
believer’s evidential state. Whether a belief is obtained through a reliable process can 
depend on facts that are not part of the believer’s evidential state and are in no way 
epistemically accessible to the believer. Yet reliabilist justification depends only on some 
of these facts that are beyond the believer’s ken. The only such facts that are to be taken 
into account when determining whether a belief conforms to this norm are facts 
pertaining to the actual reliability of the believer’s belief-forming process. Why idealize 
this far and no further? If our epistemic standpoint allows us to take into account facts 
that go beyond the believer’s evidential situation, why take into account only the facts 
that pertain to the reliability of belief-forming processes, and no other facts? There may 
be answers to these questions, but they must be answered in order to show that reliabilist 
justification is an important epistemic norm. Otherwise reliabilist justification will be the 
answer to an uninteresting question, “What would we want our beliefs to be if we had 
this much extra evidence and no more?” 
The second prospective limit to my pluralism concerns the concept of knowledge. As 
the reader may have noticed, none of the points on the epistemic spectra that I have 
discussed yields knowledge as a norm. In particular, knowledge is not the norm that one 
finds at any of the most idealized points of the spectra. I have already argued that the 
most idealized thin norm is truth; if we consider which proposition we should believe 
without reference to any limits imposed by our evidential situation, we should believe all 
and only the true ones. Truth is the norm here, not knowledge, because knowledge 
incorporates restrictions from our evidential situation; in order to know something we 
must at least have some evidence for it. This is precisely the sort of restriction that we are 
abstracting away from when we consider the ideal extreme of the epistemic spectra. 
There is no reason to think that in the ideal situation we would want to deprive ourselves 
of some true beliefs by believing all and only the things we actually know.  
Similarly, when we consider the most idealized thickest norm, we find a notion of 
understanding that goes far beyond knowledge (at least as conceived of by contemporary 
epistemologists, if not Plato). When we consider the ideal epistemic state as applied to a 
complex of beliefs rather than a single isolated belief, we will not merely want to know 
that p but to understand it as thoroughly as possible. We can know an isolated fact 
without understanding much about it, as when a trustworthy informant tells us one thing 
about a subject that is otherwise completely obscure to us.15 If our concern with an ideal 
 
15 See Lackey (2007).  
epistemic state goes beyond merely believing the right propositions, we need more than 
we are guaranteed when we know something.  
This does not prove that there is no point on the epistemic spectra from which 
knowledge will be seen to be an epistemic norm. Perhaps there is some degree of 
thickness such that the ideal norm with that thickness is knowledge. But this would 
require finding some set of facts about a belief such that a belief that was ideal with 
respect to those facts always qualified as knowledge, without guaranteeing understanding 
or anything else beyond knowledge. It may be hard to find the right thickness for 
knowledge without resorting to special pleading; and even if we can find it, it might be 
subject to the objection I raised against reliabilist justification, that we need an account of 
why this particular point on the epistemic spectra is interesting. 
In any case, I think that the best explanation for the value of knowledge is not that 
there is one particular standpoint from which knowledge is valuable, but that to know 
something is to guarantee the fulfillment of several different epistemic norms. If we know 
that p, p is true, we are justified in believing that p, there is a high chance that we have 
some understanding of p, and depending on our analysis of knowledge more norms may 
hold besides. It is useful to wrap these norms up in a single concept; even if these norms 
are all valuable from different points of view, we still may be interested in an easy way of 
expressing them all at once. Hence knowledge, even if it does not have its own place on 
the epistemic spectra, may have value as a combination of norms that do have their own 
place.16 
 
16 In Weiner (2009), I argue for a similar conception of the value of knowledge as a 
combination of properties that on their own are intrinsically valuable from different 
There is one more way to account for knowledge as an epistemic norm. I began this 
essay by claiming that epistemology is the study of our beliefs and whether they are 
good; a somewhat tendentious claim, because some would argue that our mental furniture 
is not best described in terms of belief. And indeed Williamson (2000) has argued that 
knowledge is conceptually prior to belief. Belief is best thought of, roughly, as a state that 
aspires to the condition of knowledge. If this is true, then it will be baked into our 
conception of epistemology that knowledge is an epistemic norm. Indeed, since 
Williamson holds that our evidence just is the propositions we know, then knowledge 
would be the epistemic norm that held everywhere from the ideal end of the spectrum to 
the point on the practical-ideal axis at which we find properties that depend only on our 
evidential state, since our evidential state would always distinguish propositions we know 
from those we don’t.  
But this defense of knowledge as an epistemic norm would require a radical 
reconception of what epistemology is. Unless the only way to make sense of what beliefs 
are is to conceive of them as directed at knowledge rather than truth, this conception of 
epistemology effectively assumes rather than proves that knowledge is an epistemic 
norm. And even this conception of epistemology admits of epistemic spectra. We could 
still consider thicker norms that require more complete understanding beyond knowledge, 
and more practical norms that concern what beliefs we ought to arrive at when we cannot 
know what we know. So, even if a “knowledge first” approach to epistemology radically 
alters our picture of what the epistemic norms are, it still does not entail epistemic 
 
standpoints. There my focus is on different standpoints on practical reasoning 
rather than different epistemic spectra.  
monism. There will be many standpoints from which we can ask different questions of 
our epistemology, and those questions will yield different epistemic norms. 
 
6. Why Pluralism Works 
Finally, to address the objection that the whole idea of pluralism about epistemic 
norms is incoherent. One might think that norms are supposed to be action-guiding, or 
perhaps in the epistemic case belief-guiding, so that to say that different norms apply 
from different standpoints is to deprive them of this role. For sometimes norms may 
conflict, as when a belief that would be true would not be justified. On my view a true but 
unjustified belief would satisfy one epistemic norm, one we are concerned with at the 
most idealized thin standpoint, but violate another, which we are concerned with at a less 
idealized thin standpoint. The norm we derive from one standpoint tells me to believe the 
proposition, the norm we derive from another tells me not to. How can it be the case that 
I ought to believe and not believe the same proposition?  
My response is to deny that norms are always action-guiding. A norm can express an 
ideal, even if there is no action that could guarantee achievement of this ideal. It may 
even be that when we take up a more practical standpoint we will not attempt to achieve 
the ideal, so that the more practical norm is not related to the more ideal norm in any 
obvious way. To return to the bowling example, suppose that a bowler lacks enough skill 
to consistently bowl strikes, but can consistently roll the ball down the middle of the lane 
and knock some pins down. The most ideal advice for this bowler remains “Knock down 
all the pins,” but the most practical advice may be “Roll the ball down the middle of the 
lane” rather than “Try to knock down all the pins.” Knocking down all the pins would 
lead to the highest score if it could be done, but trying to knock down all the pins may not 
lead to as high a score as simply rolling the ball down the middle of the lane. (Perhaps the 
bowler will push too hard and put the ball in the gutter.) Yet knocking down all the pins 
is still the ideal, and the bowler’s bowling is lacking insofar as it falls short of this ideal.  
In this case “Knock down all the pins” is a norm on this person’s bowling, but it is 
not an action-guiding norm. At the idealized end of the spectrum a norm can express an 
ideal, even if we cannot derive the actions that anyone ought to take from ideals that they 
fall short of. The more practical norms will guide actions, and it is no surprise when an 
action that conforms to these action-guiding norms falls short of an ideal. In such cases 
the two norms conflict, because reality falls short of the ideal.  
So it is with epistemic norms. Different epistemic norms may express the ideals to 
which our beliefs should aspire, or the ideals to which our belief systems should aspire, 
or what beliefs would be ideal given our evidential situations; or they may answer many 
other sorts of questions, at different levels of idealization. The more practical, action-
guiding norms concerning how we should form beliefs, gather evidence, or form belief-
forming habits are only some of the epistemic norms, and beliefs formed in accord with 
them may fall short of the ideal in many ways. Nor can the most practical norms be 
derived from the more ideal norms in any straightforward way. Each point on the 
epistemic spectra represents one way we might approach epistemology, one sort of 
problem we might be interested in. When we seek an epistemic norm we must choose a 
point; we must think about just what epistemological problem we are interested in. There 
is no single norm that suits every perspective on epistemology.17   
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